INTRODUCTION:
GLOBAL ORDER OF THE COURT
Martin S. Flaherty*
For worse, not better, we live in a time when evidence,
expertise, even reality itself, matter less than uniformed assertion.
Just repeat a baseless claim often enough and sooner or later it
must be true. It sadly goes without saying that this technique
provides a ticket to the White House and the Executive Branch
more generally. It should, however, more often be said that the
Supreme Court is not above the practice. This indulgence would be
bad enough in itself, especially for an institution whose legitimacy
is based upon reasoned fidelity to the law rather than a majority of
ballots. Yet merely repeating an assertion without more is doubly
problematic when the Court does so to sidestep its duty to check
misconduct of an Executive Branch that pushes past the borders of
legality—including and especially in foreign affairs.
The Supreme Court did just this at just about the same time
the papers for this symposium were being delivered. The case was
Hernández v. Mesa.1 It arose when Jesus Mesa, a US Border Patrol
agent, shot dead Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a fifteen-yearold Mexican national. At the time, Mesa was standing in US
territory while Hernández had just run across the border to
Mexico. Members of the slain teenager’s family brought a civil
action seeking damages in US District Court under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 2 alleging that Mesa violated
Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. In Bivens, the
Court had held that a person claiming to be the victim of an
unlawful arrest and search could bring a Fourth Amendment claim
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for damages against the responsible agents even though no federal
statute authorized such a claim. Later decisions extended Bivens to
claims under the Fifth 3 and Eighth 4 Amendments. The issue in
Mesa came down to applying Bivens not to additional constitutional
amendments, but rather to the “new” 5 context of alleged crossborder extrajudicial murder. Or as Justice Ginsburg put it in
dissent, “[i]s a Bivens remedy available to non-citizens (here, the
victim’s parents) when the U. S. officer acted stateside, but the
impact of his alleged wrongdoing was suffered abroad?”6
The Court answered no. Justice Alito’s majority opinion
offered several reasons. Consider them in ascending order of
judicial self-abnegation. First, Congress in related areas has
declined to provide for a cause of action for such ostensibly
extraterritorial conduct. Such inaction, moreover, must be given
additional weight given the issue involved “national security,” and
judicial intervention might undermine protection of the nation’s
borders, “[w]hen foreign relations are implicated.”7 Next, the case
involved “national security.”8 Judicial intervention in the matter of
an alleged rogue federal agent in the United States shooting an
unarmed teenager in Mexico could well undermine the protection
of the nation’s borders. Third and more broadly, Mesa involved
foreign affairs. In the majority’s words, “[t]he political branches,
not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity
to weigh foreign-policy concerns.” 9 Indeed, the Court had
previously “said that matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign
relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches
of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.’”10
Determined to repeat the theme until it became true, Justice
Alito concluded that in sum, these preceding factors, “can all be
condensed to one concern––respect for the separation of powers.”
And for him, that meant nothing less than that “‘[f]oreign policy
and national security decisions are ‘delicate, complex, and involve
3. Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 248-49 (1979).
4. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 19-25 (1980).
5. Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 17-1678, slip op. at 1, 8 (Feb. 25, 2020).
6. Id. at 1-2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
10. Id. (citations omitted).
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large elements of prophecy’ for which ‘the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities[,] nor responsibility.’”11
Justice Ginsburg, writing for three dissenters, challenged the
majority’s inaction based on foreign affairs. First, a tort action for
a cross-border shooting hardly represented an intrusion on the
province of the political branches to make foreign policy. Second,
in any event “the Court, in this case, cannot escape a ‘potential
effect on foreign relations,’ by declining to recognize a Bivens
action.” 12 Among other things, “recognizing a Bivens suit here
honors our Nation’s international commitments.”13 Displaying her
demonstrated familiarity with international law, Justice Ginsberg
pointed to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) to which the United States acceded in 1992. 14 In
particular, she cited Article 9(5) of which provides that “[a]nyone
who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.”15 All told, Justice Ginsburg
makes a compelling case.
Yet that case could be more compelling still. Such a case would
and should challenge directly the oft-repeated but rarely justified
mantra that “matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign
relations . . . are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches
of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.’”16
The present symposium arises out of the Author’s recent book
that refutes this refrain. Restoring the Global Judiciary: Why the
Supreme Court Should Rule in Foreign Affairs aims to reinvigorate
the increasingly marginalized case for robust judicial role in cases
such as Mesa. 17 Its argument is straightforward. The Supreme
Court and the federal judiciary have not only the power, but also
the duty to apply the law, including international law, in cases
properly before them without deference to the political branches.

11. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Id.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95–20, 999 U. N. T. S. 176; see also 1676 U. N. T. S. 544 (entered into force Sept. 8, 1992).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(5).
16. See Hernandez, supra note 5, at 9.
17. See generally MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019).
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This argument proceeds in four parts. The first focuses on the
expectations of the Founding. This part holds that the
Constitution’s designers and supporters were committed to a
balance among the three branches of government as much—if not
more—in foreign as in domestic affairs. They were further
markedly internationalist, with the corollary that the judiciary
should play a prominent role in matters implicating both
international law and foreign relations, especially in relation to
individual rights. Much of the impetus for the Federal Convention
came from the nation’s impotence in upholding its international
obligations. The Constitution’s Federalist supporters also favored
adherence to the law of nations as a safeguard for a new, weak
republic in the face of European superpowers. The Constitution,
therefore, strengthened the national government’s ability to
conduct foreign relations in several regards. One key component
was a national judiciary that would have jurisdiction over selfexecuting treaties, original jurisdiction over cases involving
diplomats, and the authority to implement customary
international law. Reflecting this commitment, the early Supreme
Court numbered a striking selection of prominent diplomats
among its members, including John Jay and John Marshall. The
Court accordingly tended to accord the other branches zero
deference when it came to cases involving international law or
foreign relations.18
The book’s second part explains how this Founding
conception eroded as the United States developed from a fledgling
republic to a global superpower. Over time the Founding
framework went from a balanced system with an active judicial
role to our current constitutional construct in which the Executive
claims to near-plenary foreign affairs power appear plausible. The
change occurred largely as a result of America’s emergence on the
world stage. As the nation went from world power to superpower
to hegemon, the almost inevitable result was an accretion of power
to the Executive. Evolving constitutional custom has long been an
important source of doctrine in the foreign affairs realm. When,
however, custom moves from illegitimate challenge to the
established order is another matter. This part argues that much of
the shift in power to the President is of questionable legitimacy in
18. Id. Part I.
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light of the Founding commitment to separation of powers
balance.19
The book’s third part examines how modern international
relations theory makes the Founding’s commitment to balance all
the more critical. A leading International Relations school
developed by Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie
Slaughter emphasizes the erosion of traditional sovereignty
through the emergence of the “disaggregated state.” 20 On this
understanding, nation-states no longer deal with one another as
single units. Rather, sub-units of states interact directly with their
counterparts to form “global networks” that pool information,
undertake joint projects, and establish formal ties.21 Innovative as
this scholarship is, it does not ask the key question of which set of
actors comparatively benefits. Here Restoring the Global Judiciary
argues that the Executive far and away outpaces its rivals. A distant
second is the judiciary. Hardly in the race at all are the legislators.
The implications are troubling for any state with an ongoing
commitment to separation of powers and the balance among the
branches of government that the doctrine entails. It follows that
when matters touch foreign relations, the courts should check,
rather than defer.22
The final part of the book sets out how doctrine should
develop in three sets of hotly contested areas. The first involves
access to the courts to begin with, including standing, political
question doctrine, and state secrets. The second group involves
deference to the other branches with regard to treaties, the
Constitution, and statutes. The last category addresses foreign
affairs law doctrines that implicate international human rights, and
among them are self-executing vs. non-self-executing treaties,
delegation to foreign tribunals, and interpreting domestic law
consistent with international law.23
All that said, the book’s prescriptions do come with an
ostensibly insurmountable flaw. It may seem simply too late to
turn back. But it is not. Instead, the current situation recalls the
same type of challenge that Justice Jackson addressed in his
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. Part II.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. Part III.
Id. Part IV.
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celebrated concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. 24 That opinion also identified dangerous, anticonstitutional trends resulting from deeply entrenched political
dynamics. Yet it also pointed a way forward. It suggested a solution
first in identifying the problem. Then it offered tools for addressing
it. It may appear that matters have proceeded too far. But as Justice
Jackson also observed, “it is the duty of the Court to be the last, not
first, to give . . . up” its responsibility to check assertions political
power that undermine the Constitution and with it, free
government under the law.25
Few things are more gratifying to the Author than spurring
informed and thoughtful discussion, dialogue, and debate. First,
not last, in this regard is the Fordham International Law Journal’s
present symposium issue on the Judicial Power and US Foreign
Affairs. It brings together an impressive array of diverse,
established, and rising scholars. Some agree with the arguments
made in Restoring the Global Judiciary; others do not. Yet all of
these written contributions, as well as the day’s broader panel
discussions, offer rigorous and thoughtful insights that buck the
trend of merely repeating ungrounded assertions on display in the
majority opinion in Mesa.
For this, special thanks are in order to the International Law
Journal’s editors and staff, in particular: Irene Xu, Rebecca
Zipursky, Yon Jong Yoon, and Samantha Ragonesi. My gratitude as
well to my exceptional colleagues, Pamela Bookman and Andrew
Kent, who oversaw the event as it took shape, and to Tom Lee, who
stole what time he could away from the Pentagon to take part.
Finally, my gratitude to all of the participants. To these, I am happy
to repeat a thought shared on the day. The first rule of public
relations may be that there is no such thing as bad publicity so long
as one’s name is spelled correctly. The corollary for writing a book
is that there is no such thing as unwanted criticism so long as all
agree that everyone should go out and read it. All did—and for that
I am particularly grateful.

24 . Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-60 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (1952).
25. Id. at 655.

